Friday, August 5, 2011

Birthday edition

Today is the 3rd birthday for The Defense Rests and, once again, I'd like to thank everyone who has taken the time to read and comment on what they find here. By my calculation there have been almost 88,000 pageviews in the last year (I have no idea how many since I launched the blog since I just added the page view widget last summer) and around 148 comments (including my responses). I have no idea how many people have hit the "reaction" buttons, but I know it's too many to go back and count.

The four most popular posts of the last twelve months are:
I hope you continue to find what I've posted here to be interesting, informative or at least amusing at times. Please keep the comments coming - whether it's to agree with what I've written, disagree with what I've written or to let me know I'm an idiot (so long as it's not anonymous).

So, let the party begin!





Thursday, August 4, 2011

A snitch in time

Peddling books

Over the past two weeks, John Nova Lomax at The Houston Press, has told us the incredibly bizarre tale of Denish Shah (also known as Dennis Shaw) who allegedly bilked folks out of their money by befriending them and shutting them off from everyone else. Mr. Shah currently is awaiting trial on a charge of two acts of assault of a family member.

But I'm not writing about Mr. Shah or his exploits. I was more interested in one of the sidebar stories that accompanied the article. It seems that Mr. Shah was sued by the family of a woman he once took a shining to. Mr. Shah allegedly beat the woman and abused and sexually assaulted her children.

Mr. Shah lost the civil case and a judgment of over $20 million was entered against him. No sooner was the ink on the judgment dry that Mr. Shah's attorney in the civil matter, Michael Phillips, announced that he was done with Mr. Shah and that he would be writing a book about his former client.

Mr. Phillips' book The Monster of River Oaks was published last summer.

Now even though Mr. Phillips claims not to have used any privileged information in writing his book, the entire affair seems more than a little dicey. The duty of an attorney is to represent his client and to act in his client's best interest. Abandoning a client after an adverse verdict and writing a book portraying your client as a monster hardly seems to fit the bill.  

"I can't tell you how many grandparents have come up to me emotional, thanking me for writing the book," he says. "They say that their daughters are going through relationships like this. One woman stopped me on the elevator and said she sent my book to Oprah."

Phillips claims the book is a warning to single mothers, whom he characterizes as being the most vulnerable members of our society outside of the extreme elderly. "They get run over. It's a free-fire zone on them," he says. "Extreme wealth, privilege and social standing may be no protection. Dinny was a hunter. Joan was the biggest game in town.
Phillips also claims to be the first person to have done something to stop Shah.

Our ethical duty to our clients extends beyond the actual representation. Our duty to hold their statements in confidence extends to death. Mr. Phillips duty wasn't to warn single mothers and grandmothers about his former client. His duty was to represent his client.

At what point did Mr. Phillips decide he wanted to write a book? At what point did he inform Mr. Shah of his intentions? Did his decision to dump his client and write a book affect his representation of Mr. Shah? And how in the world is calling your former client a monster acting in his best interest? 

"Unfortunately, there's always an appetite for what would purport to be the secrets of the rich and famous. Sadly, the lawyer who defended the guy, who stood in the middle of the courtroom and proclaimed that those children were lying, then tried to profit on essentially the salaciousness of selling the secrets of the rich and famous to the community.
"That is kind of insulting. It's not kind of insulting, it's damned insulting."  --  Jim Perdue, Jr.

Now I don't know Mr. Phillips. I know nothing about his representation of Mr. Shah. But I do have questions about the decisions he made after the jury came back.

As criminal defense attorneys we need to know unsavory details of our clients' lives. We need our clients to be upfront and honest with us when we discuss their case with them. That only happens when a client understands and believes that whatever he says in our office when the door is closed stays in that office for all eternity. Once our clients cease to believe that we will keep their secrets in confidence, our ability to represent them is compromised.

Mr. Phillips did none of us any favors. Of course he isn't the first attorney to write a book to capitalize on a representation - and he won't be the last. But every attorney who makes that decision brings into question whose interest he represents.

The sky is falling! Not.

Last night I ran across a blog post from a criminal defense attorney in North Texas. The post was written in reaction to the Scillitani case that I wrote about on Monday. The article stated that the Texas Department of Public Safety rewrote the regulations that govern breath testing in Texas under cover of night.
Very recently, (and apparently very quietly), the Texas Department of Public Safety relaxed its standards for the instrument certification.  The .02 agreement requirement is gone.  The multiple breath test specimen requirment is gone.  The requirment that the reference sample be maintained at a particular temperature?  Gone. 
The DPS actions immediately raise the question, why?  Why were the above requirements considered so vital to instrument certification for years no longer necessary to ensure a valid and reliable breath sample?   If this is supported by new scientific study that demonstrates the the requirement is not necessary to achieve consistent and valid breath test results, what are they?  Why have they not been publicized?  The technology behind the Intoxilzyer certainly has not changed. As a practical matter, this means that objective observers should have considerably less confidence in the validity and reliablility of the results of the Intoxilyzer 5000 when the standards for instrument certification are quietly stripped away.
That's not exactly true. The regulations (which can be found in 37 Texas Administrative Code, Section 19.4) were last amended in 2006 (Click here for the "old" regulations). No one took out the requirement that the breath test operator note the temperature of the reference solution because that requirement never existed.

Changes were made in the certification process for breath alcohol testing programs in 2006. The regulations were renumbered to make room for definitions.

Nowhere in the "old" regulations will one find a requirement that the two breath samples be within .02 g/210L of each other in order for the test to be valid. That "requirement" comes from the manner in which the machine is programmed to operate. The machine itself will invalidate a test if the two blows are more than .02 g/210L apart (at least if the reported results are more than .02 g/210L apart).

Likewise, there is no requirement that a breath test consist of multiple blows. That, too, has to do with the way in which the Intoxilyzer 5000 is programmed to operate.

I do find it disturbing, however, that, when discussing the requirement that the predicted and actual values of the reference solution be within .01, the regulations contain the phrase "or such limits set by the scientific director."

So, despite the proclamation that the sky is falling as a result of the Scillitani case, that is simply not the case. The issues of multiple blows and .02 test agreement are decided by the type of machine used to test the breath, not by Rule 19.4.

And, since Texas will (at some point) begin using the Intoxilyzer 8000, those questions will one day be moot.

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

An artist and a scientist

I read the other day that Ferran Adria, the father of molecular gastronomy, is closing the doors of his famed restaurant El Bulli. His workshop sat 50 for one dinner service a night - a service consisting of 30-40 courses and costing well in excess of $200.

I happened to be sitting in the living room flipping channels on the television when I stumbled upon the channel guide and noticed the Travel Channel would be re-airing the episode Decoding Ferran Adria from Anthony Bourdain's show. I had to watch.

Tony mentioned that he was always leery of Ferran Adria because, as an old-fashioned line cook, he was used to slaving over a hot stove in the chaos that is the kitchen of a busy restaurant. He was a chef. An artist. Ferran Adria was a scientist. Tony wanted to know if a scientist could be an artist.

The answer was a resounding yes. Mr. Adria looks at food in a different way. He wants to touch all of the diner's senses. His creations use science and technology to create food that stirs up memories in the diner. His food is both complex and whimsical.

Art + Food + Science = Gastronomy

In his cooking, Mr. Adria asks us what is a meal? He asked us what should a meal be? He wanted to know what can a meal be?


He deconstructed a meal and rebuilt it in a play of 32 acts. Each act told a story and brought forth a memory. He believed a meal should touch all of the senses - he told Tony that 70% of a plate is the scent. He was adamant that the pace and rhythm of a meal was of the utmost importance.


Watching Ferran Adria compose his symphony of tastes and smells and textures was like watching an artist at work - an artist who knew the science underlying each and every one of his creations. He is living proof that you can't have art without science, nor can you have science without art.

Book Review: False Justice

Jim Petro is a rock-ribbed Republican who is a former Attorney General of Ohio. He is the most unlikely person to get involved in the innocence movement -- but involved he is. In his book False Justice: Eight Myths that Convict the Innocent, Mr. Petro takes us on a journey that shows how innocent folks find themselves in prison and the struggle to exonerate them.

The eight myths to which Mr. Petro refers are:
  1. Everyone in prison claims innocence
  2. Our system almost never convicts an innocent person
  3. Only guilty people confess
  4. Wrongful convictions are the result of innocent human error
  5. An eyewitness is the best evidence
  6. Conviction errors get corrected on appeal
  7. It dishonors the victim to question a conviction
  8. If the justice system has problems, the pros will fix them
Mr. Petro spends a good deal of ink discussing the problems with eyewitness testimony. He points out that 25% of rape suspects are cleared when their DNA is tested against crime scene DNA prior to being indicted. He notes that 30% of witnesses choose one of the "fillers" in lineups.

In Manson v. Braithwaite, the US Supreme Court held that even if eyewitness identification process is unduly suggestive, the testimony will be heard if it meets a five point "reliability" test. Those five points are:
  1. The witness' opportunity to view the suspect at the time of the alleged crime,
  2. The witness' degree of attention,
  3. The accuracy of the witness' prior description of the suspect,
  4. The witness' level of certainty at the time of identification, and
  5. The time between the alleged crime and the identification.
Ironically enough, research has indicated that the level of the witness' certainty at the time of the identification bears no relationship to the accuracy of the identification.

Another myth that deserves being addressed is this notion that somehow questioning the legitimacy of a conviction dishonors the victims of the crime. As Mr. Petro points out, if the person convicted of the crime is, indeed, innocent, that means the real perpetrator is still on the loose. A false conviction means that an innocent man suffers, a criminal walks free and other people may have been victimized.

Of course, because the book is also an autobiography, we are subjected to Mr. Petro's political exploits in stunning detail. But, I suppose, anytime the theme of your discourse is taking the other fork in the road, you have to set yourself for the great conversion. Just read the first half of The Autobiography of Malcolm X and you'll see what I mean. It is, however, just a minor quibble, because, no matter how Mr. Petro arrived at that fork in the road, he clearly took the right path.

As a postscript to the book, in December 2010, Dean Gillispie was once again denied a new trial.

Sex, lies and SEO

Just who is Jay Smith and why is sending me spam?
Hi Paul, We just posted an article, “10 Modern Criminals Who’ve Made a Killing”, I thought I'd drop a quick line and let you know in case you thought it was something your audience would be interested in reading. (http://www.criminaljusticedegreesguide.com/features/10-modern-criminals-whove-made-a-killing.html) 
Thanks!Jay Smith
When I typed in the URL at whois.net, this is what I got:

WHOIS information for criminaljusticedegreesguide.com :
[Querying whois.verisign-grs.com]
[Redirected to whois.networksolutions.com]
[Querying whois.networksolutions.com]
[whois.networksolutions.com]
Welcome to the Network Solutions(R) Registrar WHOIS Server.

The IP address from which you have visited the Network Solutions Registrar WHOIS
database is contained within a list of IP addresses that may have failed
to abide by Network Solutions' WHOIS policy.  Failure to abide by this policy can
adversely impact our systems and servers, preventing the processing of
other WHOIS requests.

To see the Network Solutions WHOIS Policy, click on or copy and paste the following
URL into your browser:

http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/index.jhtml

If you feel that you have received this message in error, please email us using the online
form at http://www.networksolutions.com/help/email.jsp with the following information:

Whois Query: criminaljusticedegreesguide.com
YOUR IP address is 198.171.79.36
Date and Time of Query: Thu Jul 28 19:24:48 EDT 2011
Reason Code: IE


My next step was whois.domaintools.com. Here's what turned up:

Registrant:
Mavens, LLC, Career
   ATTN CRIMINALJUSTICEDEGREESGUIDE.COM
   care of Network Solutions
   PO Box 459
   Drums, PA.  US  18222
   
   Domain Name: CRIMINALJUSTICEDEGREESGUIDE.COM

   Administrative Contact, Technical Contact:
      Mavens, LLC, Career                
      ATTN CRIMINALJUSTICEDEGREESGUIDE.COM
      care of Network Solutions
      PO Box 459
      Drums, PA 18222
      US
      570-708-8780
      
   Record expires on 04-May-2013.
   Record created on 25-Sep-2008.

   Domain servers in listed order:

   NS1.HOSTMONSTER.COM          74.220.195.131
   NS2.HOSTMONSTER.COM          69.89.16.


According to aboutus.org, the site is located in Canada and the contact entity is NetVision. On the NetVision site are links to a host of worthless sites with the option to view the site in Dutch.

The website promotes itself as a guide to finding careers in criminal justice. But no matter which career you decide you are interested in, the same three schools are featured: Saint Leo University, American Intercontinental University and Arizona State University. Both SLU and AIU are online schools offering associate's degrees.

So, Jay, I'm sorry, but I have no interest in linking to your website, your article or anything else you're peddling.

Tuesday, August 2, 2011

Make way for the reverend

Opening one's eyes

Back in May I wrote about a case in Iran in which the court ordered the blinding of a man as punishment for his throwing acid in the face of a woman who had scorned him. The sentence was to be carried out because the victim, Ameneh Bahrami had demanded qisas, a form of retributive justice under Sharia law.

This past weekend, Ms. Bahrami changed her mind.  

Isna quoted Ms Bahrami as saying: "I struggled for seven years with this verdict to prove to people that the person who hurls acid should be punished through 'qisas', but today I pardoned him because it was my right.
"I did it for my country, since all other countries were looking to see what we would do."
Ms Bahrami was quoted on Iranian TV as saying: "I never wanted to have revenge on him. I just wanted the sentence to be issued for retribution. But I would not have carried it out. I had no intention of taking his eyes from him."

Ms. Bahrami pardoned her attacker, Majid Movahedi, on the day he was scheduled to have sulfuric acid placed into his eyes.

I have no idea whether Ms. Bahrami never intended for Mr. Movahedi to be blinded. For all I know this is what she wanted all along -- for Mr. Movahedi to live in fear of being blinded before pardoning him at the last minute. Maybe she was pressured to pardon him in the face of growing international concern over the cruelty of the punishment.

All I know is that it took great mercy and conviction for Mr. Bahrami to forgive the man who took her sight. As I wrote back in May, blinding Mr. Movahedi was not going to bring back Ms. Bahrami's sight. It was not going to undo the damage to her face.

In the meantime, we're appalled at the very idea that a court would order a man to be blinded as a punishment for his crime. Yet we have no qualms about the state sticking a needle in someone's arm for the express purpose of murdering them.

A recipe for reagent stew with expired chemical

It seems that it's always something with those folks up at the Southwest Institute of Forensics in Dallas. Our latest adventure in forensics has us making a reagent with an expired chemical. What could be the harm in that?

In today's story, lab analyst AML prepared a reagent for the entire lab to use. AML used an expired chemical in her concoction -- it's noted in the Lab Reagent Notebook entry dated August 28, 2009. AML seems to have no problem with breaking lab protocol by using an expired chemical in a solution that will be used to test evidence in criminal cases.

Lab analyst NV, on the other hand, wasn't so sure it was that great an idea. When she discovered what had happened, she reported it to the lab supervisor SM*. SM had the reagent QC'd (tested for quality control) and decided it was okay to use. (Interestingly enough, lab protocols do not call for this particular reagent to under QC testing prior to use.) This QC test wasn't run until after the reagent had been used for several months testing items of evidence.

*That couldn't possibly be our friend, Dr. Stacy McDonald, could it?

But, not to worry, we'll just give the chemical a new expiration date. See, that wasn't so hard, was it?

Now, what have we learned today?
  1. It's okay to use expired chemicals for testing evidence in criminal cases.
  2. It's okay to ignore written lab protocols.
  3. It's okay to QC chemicals after they've been used to analyze items of evidence.
  4. It's okay to fabricate expiration dates on chemicals.
12 01 2009 Expired Chemical Lab Notebook (2)

Monday, August 1, 2011

See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil

What do you do when you're tired of the Texas Forensic Science Commission keeps sticking its nose into whether or not an innocent man, Cameron Willingham, was murdered by the State of Texas? You have the Attorney General issue an opinion that investigating evidence that the fire was not deliberately set is outside the scope of the Commission's duties.


The Commission was created under the authority of Art. 38.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 4 lays out the duties of the Commission:
Sec. 4. (a) The commission shall: (1) develop and implement a reporting system through which accredited laboratories, facilities, or entities report professional negligence or misconduct; (2) require all laboratories, facilities, or entities that conduct forensic analyses to report professional negligence or misconduct to the commission; and (3) investigate, in a timely manner, any allegation of professional negligence or misconduct that would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a forensic analysis conducted by an accredited laboratory, facility, or entity. (b) An investigation under Subsection (a)(3): (1) must include the preparation of a written report that identifies and also describes the methods and procedures used to identify: (A) the alleged negligence or misconduct; (B) whether negligence or misconduct occurred; and (C) any corrective action required of the laboratory, facility, or entity; and (2) may include one or more: (A) retrospective reexaminations of other forensic analyses conducted by the laboratory, facility, or entity that may involve the same kind of negligence or misconduct; and (B) follow-up evaluations of the laboratory, facility, or entity to review: (i) the implementation of any corrective action required under Subdivision (1)(C); or (ii) the conclusion of any retrospective reexamination under Paragraph (A). (c) The commission by contract may delegate the duties described by Subsections (a)(1) and (3) to any person the commission determines to be qualified to assume those duties. (d) The commission may require that a laboratory, facility, or entity investigated under this section pay any costs incurred to ensure compliance with Subsection (b)(1). (e) The commission shall make all investigation reports completed under Subsection (b)(1) available to the public. A report completed under Subsection (b)(1), in a subsequent civil or criminal proceeding, is not prima facie evidence of the information or findings contained in the report.
When the law was passed in 2005, the act was to apply to evidence tested or offered into evidence after September 1, 2005. The point, presumably, was to provide a safeguard against junk science being admitted into evidence after the effective date of the act by giving the Commission the power to regulate and investigate forensic facilities to ensure that proper scientific procedures were being followed.

The Attorney General takes this to mean that the Commission may not investigate any items or analysis entered into evidence prior to the effective date of the act.

Section 4 limits the scope of the Commission's inquiries to "accredited" entities - but does not define what constitutes an accredited entity. The acts also fails to state whether it mattered if the entity was accredited before or after the effective date.

The Attorney General then refers to Article 38.35(d)(1) to limit the scope of the Commission to entities that were accredited at the time the analysis took place.
Except as provided by Subsection (e), a forensic analysis of physical evidence under this article and expert testimony relating to the evidence are not admissible in a criminal action if, at the time of the analysis, the crime laboratory conducting the analysis was not accredited by the director under Section 411.0205, Government Code.
Well, that's all well and good, Mr. AG, but we're not talking about whether any item of evidence is admissible. We're talking about reviewing an old case to determine whether an innocent man was executed as the result of junk science. Now I understand that Gov. Goodhair is worried that when the world realizes he sat on his hands while an innocent man was murdered by the State of Texas it might cause a bit of a problem for his presidential campaign -- but Gov. Perry's political aspirations are secondary to whether or not an innocent man was murdered.

Gov. Perry began his assault on the Commission when he placed Williamson County District Attorney John Bradley in charge of the Commission on the eve of a hearing in which an arson expert was going to testify that the fire in question was not deliberately set. Through Mr. Bradley, Gov. Perry did everything he could to prevent the Commission from hearing evidence, in public, that Mr. Willingham was innocent. The last thing he wanted was a public record of the murder of an innocent man. Now Greg Abbott is providing cover for the fair-haired one.

Let's think about this for a second. The Commission may only investigate evidence analyzed by forensic facilities that were accredited at the time the evidence was offered. The two bozos who investigated the fire that killed Mr. Willingham's children weren't accredited by the DPS. They had no scientific background at all. Yet, they were allowed to testify that (based on their "gut feeling") Mr. Willingham set the fire that killed his children. So, because the state was permitted to put junk science before a jury that didn't know better, the Commission is not allowed to examine whether or not the evidence should have been admissible.

The purpose of the Commission should be to seek the truth, not to provide political cover for a governor who wants to be president.

A regulation by any other name isn't worth a damn

In order for scientific evidence to be admissible in a Texas court, the party wishing to put such evidence before the court must show that (1) the underlying scientific theory is valid, (2) the technique applying the theory is valid and (3) the technique was applied properly on the date in question. This is known as the Kelly standard.

When applied to alcohol breath testing it means that who ever operates the breath test machine is doing so in accordance with the Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Regulations. These regulations can be found in Title 37 of the Texas Administrative Code, Part 1, Chapter 19, Subchapter A.

Rule 19.4 governs the proper method for administering a breath test to a person arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Rule 19.4(c) deals specifically with the what the breath test operator has to do in order for a breath test to be valid.

The Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Program Operator Manual states that the operating temperature of the reference sample device ("simulator") is 34 degrees C plus or minus .2 degrees C. The manual states that the "operator may verify the correct temperature by observing the thermometer on the front of the device."

The simulator has a heating element to warm the alcohol solution to the proper temperature, a thermostat to maintain that temperature and a stirring paddle to ensure an even temperature inside the jar.

The simulator is used "to verify the accuracy and calibration of the [intoxilyzer]." The breath test machine analyzes the alcohol concentration inside the simulator as a part of every breath test.

In Scillitani v. Texas, No. 14-08-00430-CR, (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2011), the Houston Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether or not the breath test operator was required to verify the temperature of the solution inside the simulator.

The court rejected Mr. Scillitani's argument on the grounds that nowhere in the breath test regulations does it state that the breath test operator must verify the temperature of the solution inside the simulator.

According to Rule 19.4(c)(4), in order for a breath test to be valid, the result of the machine's analysis of the solution inside the simulator must be within .01 g/210 L "or such limits as set by the scientific director." That rule did not change when the breath test regulations were updated effective March 2006.

There's a problem with the court's conclusion, however. The simulator is supposed to be a tool used to calibrate the breath test machine. The breath test machine sucks in a certain amount of vapor from the headspace gas inside the simulator. That vapor is then analyzed to determine its alcohol concentration and to compare it with the predicted value. But if the solution is outside the designated tolerance, can we trust that the machine is calibrated properly?

If you take a jar of water and alcohol and seal it, Henry's Law* says that the alcohol concentration in the headspace above the solution should be the same as the alcohol concentration of the solution. Heat up the solution and the molecules will become more active and the alcohol concentration will rise. Reduce the temperature and the opposite will occur.

Even if the vapor from the simulator is within .01 g/210 L of the predicted value, if the temperature is outside the required tolerance, questions must be raised about whether the breath test machine is calibrated correctly. Is the actual value different from the predicted value because the machine isn't working? Is it because the simulator solution wasn't mixed properly in the first place? Is it because the sample chamber is contaminated in some way? These are all legitimate questions that can't be answered without knowing the actual temperature of the simulator solution.

Now let's think about this logically for a second. Why would the manual produced by the Department of Public Safety and used to train both breath test operators and technical supervisors state that the temperature of the simulator solution must be within a certain tolerance of 34 degrees C if it wasn't necessary to verify that temperature? Why not just rely on the machine's analysis of the vapor from the simulator? Why put a thermometer on the simulator?

If the question is whether or not a breath test was conducted properly, then shouldn't we be looking at the Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Program Operator Manual, the book used to train breath test operators, to make that determination?

* Henry's Law is remarkably similar to the Hermetic concept of "As above, so below." You can also find it in the so-called Emerald Tablet, the foundation of the alchemists' belief system. The breath test machine conducts its own form of alchemy by turning a measurement of length into a volumetric measurement.

Saturday, July 30, 2011

DPS offers new way to request ALR hearings in Texas

It looks like we have a new method of requesting ALR hearings to contest license suspensions in Texas. The Department of Public Safety has added this link to their page that allows you to request a hearing online.

https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/DriverLicense/customer_service/SendForms/alr.asp

The Notice of Suspension handed to anyone arrested on a DWI does not mention a hearing can be requested online so I wouldn't rely solely on the internet to make a request. I would also be leery of "bugs in the aether" that could intercept the request.

As I already send my requests by fax and certified mail, maybe I'll just save the postage and send my requests by fax and through the DPS website from now on.

Friday, July 29, 2011

The wreckage of the batmobile

I've written at length about the problems with the Houston Police Department's BATmobiles and I've written about the departure of every technical supervisor from HPD's "Crime Lab." It would appear that our stories have intersected.

Amanda Culbertson, the former technical supervisor for HPD's breath test machines, told a judge on Thursday that she and the others left the city's employ because of their concerns with the BATmobile program. Ms. Culbertson said that she left because she feared retaliation from HPD over her criticism of the program.

According to the Houston Chronicle's Brian Rogers:

[Amanda Culbertson] and others worked to train technicians to keep air conditioning units on to regulate the temperature of the breath machine that measures blood alcohol levels in suspected drunken drivers. She also said an electrical glitch that was never fixed meant the sophisticated measuring machines would reset every time the van's air conditioner was turned on. 
She said she supported the idea of a mobile testing site, but that HPD did not work to maintain the accuracy of the test results. 
"In theory it's a great idea, but it depends on who is in charge of the environmental conditions," Culbertson said.

If Ms. Culbertson's story is true, I would like to know whether the folks charged with DWI who blew into machines in the BATmobiles were informed of her concerns over the accuracy of the test results. The prosecutors, as to be expected, threw up their arms and told the judge they had no knowledge of any of this.

As an aside, the article notes that the attorneys subpoenaed Ms. Culbertson after she finished testifying in another court. Well, that's not exactly true. While the attorneys may have drafted the subpoena, Ms. Culbertson was served by none other than my brother, Dan, who is a private investigator and process server.

And this brings us back to the bigger issue - why are the labs running these tests and maintaining these machines operated by the same folks who are out there arresting motorists for driving while intoxicated? There can be no objectivity in such a setting. What does it say when the person in charge of the machines feels so threatened by her employer that she walks away from her job? If the folks in charge of the crime lab were interested in the quality of the science, why would they ignore the concerns of Ms. Culbertson?

The folks in charge should have been happy that she came to them with her concerns. They should have welcomed the opportunity to correct problems with the program. Instead, because she wouldn't stick to the script, they ran her off.

This is not to absolve Ms. Culbertson from blame, however. If she was aware of the problems back in 2009, why wasn't she testifying that she had grave concerns over the accuracy of breath tests conducted in the BATmobiles? Why wait until she's taken another job as a technical supervisor overlooking machines used in the county?

The mission of science is to discover the truth. Science is misused when it's made to fit the facts of the state's case.

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Attacking their own

The Republican primary for Presiding Judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Affirms Appeals should be a most interesting affair as a sitting judge, Lawrence Meyers, challenges the incumbent, Sharon Killer Keller.

Judge Meyers was elected to the highest criminal court in the state in 1992, after serving on the Fort Worth Court of Appeals from 1989-1992. Prior to serving on the appellate bench, Judge Meyers practiced civil, criminal and appellate law in Fort Worth. Before moving to Fort Worth in 1975, Judge Meyers was a prosecutor in Kansas.

Judge Meyers authored the Court's opinion in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 SW2d 202 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) in which the court held that the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution "forbids, not just the execution, but the incarceration as well of an innocent person." Judge Killer Keller, on the other hand, joined in the dissent, on the grounds that reopening cases to determine whether the defendant was, in fact, innocent, threatened the "finality" of jury verdicts. Heaven forbid!

Judge Killer Keller is best known for ignoring protocol and closing the court to prevent Michael Richard's attorneys from filing a last minute appeal on the afternoon of his scheduled execution. Judge Killer Keller was found to have violated the rules of the court and was issued a public warning for her actions. The decision was later overturned as the Commission on Judicial Conduct was not authorized to issue a public warning. Judge Killer Keller is also known as Judge No as she is consistently dissenting from court opinions recognizing that the Bill of Rights contains protections for criminal defendants.

The mere fact that a fellow member of the CCA is challenging the presiding judge is telling. The fact that both judges are Republicans should make it clear that many in the GOP have grown weary of Judge Killer Keller's act. Through her actions in the Michael Richard affair, the Presiding Judge brought disdain and ridicule to the Court.

This one race might be enough to encourage Democrats to cross over and vote in the Republican primary next spring to oust Judge Killer Keller from the bench.

Shooting mosquitoes with a shotgun

I had a very interesting conversation with a client the other night. We had just finished resolving a couple of traffic tickets out in Magnolia when my client asked me if I had time to talk.

It turns out that he's doing research into the effects of marijuana on athletes and wanted to know my opinion of the current drug laws. I realized over the course of our conversation that I had some general ideas but I had absolutely no idea what would be the best way to implement them.

Most folks who are charged with possession are battling addictions of some form. Using the court system to treat an addiction problem makes as much sense as using a shotgun to control mosquitoes. Our court system is designed to determine whether a person actually did what the government accused them of doing - and, if so, assessing punishment. That's it. End of story.

Our court system is not designed to diagnose a medical condition and design a treatment program around the diagnosis. Placing a person in a pretrial diversion program with the threat of prison looming over their heads if they relapse is just not going to get the desired effect. Everyone who has battled an addiction has fallen down on the road to recovery. Everyone relapses at some point.

When an addict suffers a relapse, entering a conviction and carting them off to prison does nothing to cure that addiction. When an addict suffers a relapse he or she needs more help. They need someone who can pick them up and get them back on the road. They don't need to be "treated" by lawyers and probation officers and judges; they need to be treated by medical and mental health professionals who aren't concerned with the number of cases on their docket. They need to be treated by someone who isn't concerned about the latest polls.

Having said that, I haven't the foggiest idea how we get there. I just know that what we've got right now isn't working. I'm open for suggestions.

There's an axiom in economics and business that an organization should concentrate on performing those tasks that it performs best. Economists call it comparative advantage and business people call it specialization. Either way, it's a better way to use your resources than trying to do a little of this and a little of that.

Using the criminal (in)justice system to treat a public health problem is just such a waste of valuable resources.

Wednesday, July 27, 2011

New website to check driver license status

If you need to check the driver's license status of yourself or a client, here's a new website from the State of Texas that will allow you to make a quick check:

https://txapps.texas.gov/txapp/txdps/dlreinstatement/login.do

The site will give the license status, compliance requirements, other requirements and necessary fees to be paid.

The execution shall not be televised

So what was the big brouhaha over a Georgia inmate who wanted to have his execution videotaped? We see much worse every night on cable or on the big screen. Why didn't the state want his execution captured for all posterity?

It used to be that executions were all scheduled for a minute after midnight. Nothing like a good killing in the middle of the night when all law-abiding citizens were tucked away safely in bed. Probably best not to let the decent folk see just how violent a death one suffered in the electric chair or in the gas chamber.

At some point legislators decided that Ol' Sparky might have been a bit too barbaric for our tastes. Someone decided that killing people by lethal injection was a cleaner, more sanitized method of murder. The condemned man is strapped to a gurney - just as if it were an ordinary medical procedure.

The three drug "cocktail" consists of a sedative, a muscle relaxer and a drug to induce cardiac arrest. In theory the condemned man should drift into unconsciousness before he is paralyzed and his heart is stopped. Of course since the inmate is paralyzed we don't know whether or not he's suffering as the last of the drugs is pumped into his body. We can't even be certain that the first drug puts him in unconscious state.

Is that what the state's afraid of? Were Georgia officials worried that their killing device wasn't as sterile as advertised?

We have no problem watching make believe carnage in which people are gunned down, stabbed, slashed, decapitated, drowned and burned alive. We have no problem promoting violence and blood in the name of making money. Hell, the military releases video showing bombs destroying buildings - and the people inside - when it suits their political needs. The media has replayed the 9/11 attacks endlessly. But, for some reason, the state has a problem with the public seeing what it does in the people's name behind closed doors.

So what if someone wants an execution videotaped for use in a legal proceeding to argue that the death penalty constituted cruel or unusual punishment. Of course state sponsored murder is cruel. Death is cruel. There are no two ways about it. No matter how much lipstick you put on a pig, it's still a damn pig.

Just as everyone accused of breaking the law in Texas has the right to have their case heard in an open courtroom, those sentenced to death should have the right to have their execution videotaped. As long as states resist demands to record executions, I continue to wonder what they have to hide.

See also:

Tuesday, July 26, 2011

In Utah, no reasonable suspicion? No problem

In order to make a valid traffic stop in Texas, a law enforcement officer must either have probable cause to arrest or reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity is afoot. As nebulous and logically bankrupt as reasonable suspicion is, the bottom line is an officer must point to a traffic violation, other illegal act or objective reasons to believe the motorist is breaking the law in order for the stop to be legal.

It is not enough that an officer had a good faith belief (whatever that is) that a motorist committed a traffic offense - if it wasn't a traffic offense, the stop - and all evidence gathered as a result of the stop - is no good.

In Utah, on the other hand, the state Supreme Court has thrown a lifeline to police officers who can't figure out whether a motorist has committed a traffic violation or not. In State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40 (No. 20090835) (Utah 2011), the court held that if an officer makes a stop and finds out he was in error he can approach the driver to let him know about the mistake -- and, if he develops new reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, he may "respond accordingly."

A state trooper observed Mr. Vance Morris driving on a two-lane highway one night. Mr. Morris appeared to be "bumping" the fog line. The trooper, Travis Williams, turned on his video camera and began to follow Mr. Morris. When it appeared there was no license plate on the car, Trooper Williams initiated a traffic stop. As he approached the car he saw a temporary tag on the car.

Trooper Williams informed Mr. Morris that he was mistaken in pulling him over -- but then he smelled the (evil) odor of an alcoholic beverage on Mr. Morris' breath. And, as you can probably guess, Mr. Morris found himself in the backseat of Trooper Williams' patrol car charged with DWI and, here's the kicker, possession of a controlled substance (a search of the car turned up drugs and drug paraphernalia).

The trial court (and this should not be a surprise to anyone) denied Mr. Morris' motion to suppress on the grounds that even though the basis of the stop was questionable, it was perfectly reasonable for the officer to approach Mr. Morris and inform him of the mistake. The appeals court disagreed and ruled in Mr. Morris' favor on the grounds that there was no legal basis for the stop and that Trooper Williams no longer had reasonable suspicion once he spotted the valid temporary tag.

In its opinion, the court said:

Although we appreciate the court of appeals’ effort to vigilantly protect the constitutional rights of our citizens, we also conclude that the court of appeals misapplied the Fourth Amendment’s command that searches and seizures be reasonable.  As we discuss in more detail below, we first conclude that Trooper Williams’s stop was justified at its inception.  Next, we conclude that, in light of the factual circumstances that followed,Trooper Williams’s further detention of Mr. Morris was also a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

That's right. The appeals court apparently was confused about the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The court then twisted logic even further with this:

Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may stop a vehicle only if the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the driver or a passenger is engaged in criminal activity. Although to be lawful, reasonable suspicion must be based on “‘specific and articulable facts and rational inferences,’” “[a] police officer need not actually observe a violation” to make a stop. “Instead, ‘as long as an officer suspects that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic . . . regulations, the police officer may legally stop the vehicle.’” The  fact  that  an  officer mistakenly relies on objective facts that upon closer review suggest that the stop would not be justified will not automatically render the subsequent search unconstitutional.  Indeed, “[a] factual belief that is mistaken, but held reasonably and in good faith, can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.”

So, there you go. If you should find yourself driving along the highways and byways of Utah, be careful because the police don't even have to have a valid reason to stop you. And don't count on that pesky little Fourth Amendment to save your ass because, at least in the Beehive State, it doesn't mean what it says.

(H/T FourthAmendment.com)

Doing as I say...

Prosecutors can be a sanctimonious bunch. Not all of them, keep in mind, but more than a few. You know the ones I'm talking about. The ones who feel the need to lecture your client before accepting a plea. The ones who tell you that your client needs to think about his priorities. The one who decides he's going to send a message to your client.

But then there are the prosecutors who will look you in the eye and tell you that your client needs to learn a lesson then go out and feel privileged to do as they wish regardless of the law.

That brings us to Bronx prosecutor Jennifer Troiano. Ms. Troiano has a problem. A severe problem. She's hasn't been forced to try to resolve it because there's always someone willing to cover for her. That is until August of last year when she was involved in a three-car accident in New York. That night Ms. Troiano was arrested and charged with DWI. You see, in the past, Ms. Troiano could always rely on a friendly police officer or fellow prosecutor to make it all go away.

Not that night, though. Officer Elliot Zinstein didn't cooperate. Ms. Troiano even suggested he contact Nestor Ferreiro in the DA's office. Officer Zinstein chose not to.

Officer Zinstein's reward for making the arrest was a transfer from the Bronx to Brooklyn.

Mr. Zinstein didn't take kindly to the transfer and let Internal Affairs investigators know about it. As a result, last week, Officer Zinstein is back patrolling in the Bronx.

Ms. Troiano, on the other hand, is still in need of help. Whether it's for alcoholism or arrogance remains to be seen.

Our clients come to us with their own demons. They find themselves in court because of a bad choice, an ill-informed decision or an addiction. We're not social workers - we can't rid our clients of their demons - but we can attempt to get them some help along the way. That path is often blocked by a prosecutor who lectures us about our client's attitude and actions. A prosecutor who has his or her own demons with which to deal.

Maybe Ms. Troiano will come away from this with a new perspective. Maybe she'll go about her business as if nothing ever happened. Maybe she'll even find herself on the other side of the aisle proclaiming that she always wanted to be a defense attorney.

People make bad choices now and again. Not all of those choices should lead to them being branded as a criminal for life.

Monday, July 25, 2011

More than half of Texas students suspended or expelled

The results of a longitudinal study that followed one million Texas seventh-graders for six years reveals that 60% of those students were suspended or expelled at least once before finishing high school.

That is an astounding number - and an indictment of disciplinary policy in Texas schools.The purpose of public education is to ensure that every child in Texas receives a quality education through high school. Policies that result in more than half of our children being suspended or expelled and policies that introduce children to the criminal (in)justice system for misconduct at school are antithetical to the mission of our schools.

Mike Thompson of the Council of State Governments Justice Center said that this is a continuation of a 20-year trend that has seen suspension and expulsion rates double across the country. I guess it's a lot easier to educate the children who behave and leave everyone else to fend for themselves. But kids who drop out, are expelled or who fail to graduate for some other reason are more likely to find themselves caught up in the criminal (in)justice system as adults.

There are already too many folks under the thumb of the government. We don't need more.

Thompson said that's the problem: Expulsion and suspension policies focus too much on punishment, and not enough on addressing the misbehavior and having students learn from their mistakes. 
"We think the findings in this report should prompt policymakers in Texas and everywhere else to ask this question: Is our state school discipline system getting the desired results?" Thompson said.

According to the study, almost one-in-six children were punished eleven times or more. Of those, about half ended up in juvenile justice centers or alternative schools for 73 days or more. Those are the kids who tend to repeat grades or drop out of school without graduating.

The study also revealed that 70% of black girls were either suspended or expelled compared to 37% of white girls for the same or similar offenses. That's hardly a coincidence. Disciplinary decisions tend to be made solely by a teacher or administrator - hence there are no checks-and-balances to ensure that all students are treated equally.

The report also looked at the fascination that Texas schools have with issuing Class C citations for behavior that a generation ago would have been handled in class or within the school. Talking back to the teacher or disrupting class make it harder for teachers to do their jobs -- but charging a kid with a criminal offense and requiring them to miss school to appear in court with their parents is not the way to resolve it. We should be looking at ways to reduce the number of people introduced to the criminal (in)justice system, not the other way around.

State Sen. John Whitmire (D-Houston) voiced his concern to the Houston Chronicle about schools farming out disciplinary problems to the courts:

Whitmire complained of "large inner-city school districts creating a large bureaucracy to deal with oftentimes just dumb teenage behavior that can be corrected short of making it a crime." 
Whitmire said the report confirms his concern over the continual growth in criminalizing classroom behavior. 
"We all want safe schools, an orderly environment and for teachers to be left alone," said Whitmire, the senior member of the Texas Senate. "The nonsense begins with overusing the issuance of Class C misdemeanor tickets and the tremendous growth of school district police departments."

Schools should be places of learning. Schools should be a refuge from the harsh realities of life. They shouldn't serve as a way station to the criminal (in)justice system.

See also:

"Majority of Texas middle and high school students suspended or expelled," Grits for Breakfast (July 19, 2011)
"Breaking Schools' Rules: A statewide study of how school discipline relates to students' success and juvenile justice involvement," The Council of State Governments

Covering one's backside - forensics edition

You run a crime lab forensics institute that specializes in assisting the state in gathering and analyzing evidence. On a logbook you see that a reagent used for blood testing was used for years after its expiration date. The notes indicating the expiration date aren't initialed and look like they were added after the original entries in the book. You determine that notes were written by the analyst. You speak with the analyst and ask him (or her) to initial the notes regarding the expiration date.

Voila! Job well done.

No need to request corrective action. No need to alert anyone that your lab techs were using chemicals that had passed their expiration dates. No need to inform prosecutors that there might be a problem with the analysis your lab performed. No need to inform defense attorneys that the tests might not be valid.

You draft a memo and attach it to the back of the logbook.

No e-mails to track down and preserve. No Corrective Action Requests subject to Open Records requests. No memo in a file that some pesky auditor might find.

Good work, Dr. Stacy McDonald. You've shown that you are more concerned about an analyst initializing notes about expired reagents than the fact that your lab was using expired reagents while conducting forensic tests that would be used by the state at trial.

Hmm. Dr. Stacy McDonald. That name seems familiar for some reason.

03 06 2009 Reagent Log Notebook Memo on Back Cover

Saturday, July 23, 2011

Mayor Parker to voters: "Screw you!"

In response to residents who voted to get rid of red light cameras, Houston Mayor Annise Parker announced that the cameras will being generating citations at 12:01am on Sunday. In doing so, Mayor Parker is giving residents the middle finger because she's more concerned about a contract with an out-of-state vendor than she is with the will of the voters in Houston.

It gets even worse, however. Police Chief Charles McClelland told the Houston Chronicle that the city would put up more cameras in the future. This despite a study showing that intersections with cameras saw an increase in the number of accidents after the cameras were installed.

Here's hoping that voters will remember how the mayor disregarded their decision on red light cameras come November.

Googling our brains

A new study indicates that the internet has changed the way we remember things. It appears that if we know we can access the information on the computer (or internet) that we have less ability to recall the actual information -- though we certainly can remember where to find it.
Sparrow says her movie trivia failure reminded her of a concept called transactive memory, proposed 30 years ago by her Ph.D. adviser Daniel Wegner. According to the theory, people divide the labor of remembering certain types of shared information. For example, a husband might rely on his wife to remember significant dates, while she relies on him to remember the names of distant friends and family—and this frees both from duplicating the memories in their own brains. Sparrow wondered if the Internet is filling this role for everyone, representing an enormous collective act of transactive memory.
To test this idea, Sparrow devised a series of offline experiments to catch people in the act of relying on future access to information—say, a Google search—rather than memorizing the information themselves. “I didn't want them to actually have access to the information but just think that they would,” she says. For the first set of experiments, which involved 106 Harvard undergraduates working on desktop computers, Sparrow tested whether people thought of the Internet as soon as they were posed true-false questions such as, “An ostrich's eye is bigger than its brain.” She employed a psychological method called a Stroop task. After the trivia questions were posed, various colored words would appear on the screen. When those words matched topics that people were already thinking about, they tended to react more slowly when asked to name the words' colors. And indeed, when the colored words were Internet-related, such as Google or Yahoo, the students answered more slowly, indicating that they were already considering going online for answers.
Then Sparrow played a trick on her subjects. She presented 40 different trivia statements to the students and had them type the factoids on the computer. She told half of the group in advance that the computer would save what they had written so they could see it later; she told the other half that the computer would erase it. Then all of the students were challenged to write down the statements from memory. Those who had been told that the computer would erase their notes had by far the best memory of the statements, as if their brains had made an emergency backup. Those who were expecting to retrieve the information later performed more poorly.
"Transactive memory" is the phenomenon that Dr. Daniel Wegner says he seems with long-term couples. According to his research, couples who have been together a long time tend to rely on each other to remember things. You can think these long-term couples as parallel computers. One partner might be best at remembering the day-to-day activities of life while the other partner is the "encyclopedia."

So the concept isn't new, but what does it mean?

Does "transactive memory" affect jurors? Is it something that we need to be aware of during jury selection? Are jurors more or less likely to go home and do their own research? Or is this all much ado about nothing?

Is the internet just our instant library? When we went to school we certainly didn't memorize everything we were taught. We memorized our alphabet and our multiplication tables as well as some rules in geometry. But what we really learned was how to find the answer to a problem. Dr. Roddy Roediger at Washington University in St. Louis doesn't find the results to be all that alarming.
The study is “convincing,” and “there is no doubt that our strategies are shifting in learning,” says Roddy Roediger, a psychologist at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. “Why remember something if I know I can look it up again? In some sense, with Google and other search engines, we can offload some of our memory demands onto machines.” But Roediger says this trend started long before the Internet. “When I was a student, many years ago, we consulted books and encyclopedias to write papers. Now students can do it at home on computers. Is that a bad thing? I don't think so.”
Said Dr. Sparrow:
"I don't think Google is making us stupid - we're just changing the way that we're remembering things... If you can find stuff online even while you're walking down the street these days, then the skill to have, the thing to remember, is where to go to find the information. It's just like it would be with people - the skill to have is to remember who to go see about [particular topics]."
Might this be a reason to request that jurors be allowed to take notes during trial? If we are better able to process where to find the information rather than remember the information, would it be a benefit for jurors to write down their thoughts and observations during trial, rather than try to remember what they saw and heard afterward?

Or would it prove more of a distraction? Would jurors spend so much time taking notes that they miss the essence of the testimony or evidence presented? Would jurors then rely on other people's notes back in the jury room during deliberations?

Just a little something to think about.

Friday, July 22, 2011

Splitting hairs and denying relief

In 1999, Neal Hampton Robbins was convicted of capital murder in the death of his girlfriend's 17-month-old child. In 2011, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his request for relief due as a result of "false or misleading testimony."

During the investigation into the death of the child, Dr. Patricia Moore of the Harris County Medical Examiner's Office was asked to conduct an autopsy. She concluded in her report that the child died due to "asphyxia of the chest and abdomen" and that the child was the victim of a homicide. At trial, the defense expert, Dr. Robert Bux of the Bexar County Medical Examiner's Office testified that the cause and manner of death could not be determined.

In 2007, Dr. Dwayne Wolf of the HCMEO was asked to review Dr. Moore's findings in the case. In May of that year, Dr. Wolf amended the death certificate to indicate that the cause and manner of death could not be determined. Dr. Moore's supervisor at the time of the autopsy, Dr. Joye Carter, told Montgomery County prosecutors that she concurred with Dr. Wolf's findings.

Then Dr. Moore sent a letter to the Montgomery County DA's Office and stated:
I believe that there are unanswered questions as to why the child died, and I still feel that this is a suspicious death of a young child. Given my review of all the material from the case file and having had more experience in the field of forensic pathology, I now feel that an opinion for a cause and manner of death of undetermined, undetermined is best for this case.
Dr. Moore went on to state that since the date of the autopsy she had received additional training and believed that the bruises on the child's body could have been caused by aggressive CPR or other attempts to revive the child.

In June 2007, Mr. Robbins filed a writ of habeas corpus asking that his conviction be vacated as the result of newly discovered evidence. The State of Texas, in its initial response, concurred. The trial court, however, appointed another forensic pathologist to review the documents in the case. Dr. Thomas Wheeler of the Baylor College of Medicine also concluded that the cause and manner of death could not be determined.

A Montgomery County Justice of the Peace then appointed another forensic pathologist to review the case. This time the state got what it wanted - Linda Norton concluded that the child was suffocated. She said she believed the child was murdered but could not state beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Robbins killed the child.

In August 2008, both Mr. Robbins and the state prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law stating that Mr. Robbins was entitled to a new trial. However, after Ms. Norton reaffirmed her opinion that the child was murdered, the state changed its tune and urged the court not to grant any relief to Mr. Robbins.

In January 2010, the trial court denied relief for Mr. Robbins stating that the changed opinion of an expert witness was not sufficient to overturn a jury's decision to convict.

Last month the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that since Dr. Moore's trial testimony hadn't been proven false, that Mr. Robbin's claim of actual innocence failed. The majority found that Dr. Moore's changed opinion did not render her trial testimony false. The court relied on the fact that Dr. Moore testified "openly" about her findings and conclusions.

The court's rationale was that no one testified that Mr. Robbins didn't commit the murder.
Here, similar to the criminalist's testimony that she could not positively identify the sample, cross-examination by the Applicant established that Moore's testimony was her professional opinion and that she was not ruling out other reasonable hypothesis by which Tristen died. In addition, like the criminalist's testimony, that asphyxia was the cause and homicide the manner of Tristen's death has not been entirely refuted. As the convicting court determined, "[n]o expert rules out asphyxia as the cause of death," "[n]o expert can exclude Applicant as the perpetrator if it is a homicide, and no expert has excluded homicide as the manner of death." During the habeas proceedings, various experts have opined that the autopsy findings do not adequately support Moore's conclusion that the death was a homicide by asphyxiation (and Moore herself has adopted that position, but none of the experts have stated that Tristen could not have been intentionally asphyxiated. And although they critique Moore's interpretation of the petechiae evidence upon which she relied at trial, the "non-specific" indicator cannot be ruled out as being the result of asphyxiation. On the other hand, at least one well-qualified pathologist, Dr. Norton, has concluded that the child was a victim of homicide by asphyxiation.
In dissent, Judge Alcala (the newest member of the panel) argued that the majority was splitting hairs and denying Mr. Robbins the relief to which he was entitled. She wrote:
The record shows that, as the sole witness establishing cause and manner of death for the State at Robbins's trial, Dr. Moore testified that, based on her scientific opinion beyond a reasonable doubt, the cause of Tristen Rivet's death was asphyxia due to compression of the chest and abdomen, and the manner of death was homicide. In her evidence concerning this application for a writ of habeas corpus, she now concludes that the cause of death was, beyond a reasonable doubt, not compression asphyxia, and undeterminable as to homicide, asphyxial or otherwise. Dr. Moore's subsequent testimony is a complete refutation of her trial testimony because, although her trial testimony stated that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the cause of death was compression asphyxia and the manner of death was homicide, she now says that the cause and manner of death are, beyond a reasonable doubt, "undeterminable." Both positions cannot be true. This wholesale refutation of her previously professed scientific certainty nullifies the veracity of the conclusion itself... 
Perhaps Dr. Moore's testimony could not be called "false" if, for example, she consistently determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the manner and cause of death could be established with scientific certainty and that the manner of death was homicide, but was uncertain whether the cause of death was asphyxia by some means other than compression. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935) ("The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to 'affect the substantial rights' of the accused."). But Dr. Moore's changed testimony is not merely a variance in proof. Her present position acknowledges that the cause and manner of death could possibly be natural causes or homicide and that both are equally likely. An acknowledgment that trial testimony could possibly be correct because no one can determine the cause and manner of death with scientific certainty is vastly different from evidence that the cause and manner of death are proven beyond a reasonable doubt with scientific certainty. I, therefore, agree with the trial court's assessment that the record shows that Dr. Moore's testimony was false.
Mr. Robbins should receive a new trial. While Dr. Moore didn't lie on the stand during Mr. Robbins' trial, she has re-evaluated her findings and she has come to a new conclusion. That new conclusion contradicts the testimony she gave at trial. Had the jury heard this new testimony, the question becomes was there a murder?

I think we owe it to Mr. Robbins to find out.